Evidence on the Value of Director Monitoring: A Natural Experiment by Bennett, Benjamin Frank (Author) et al.
  
Evidence on the Value of Director Monitoring: A Natural Experiment  
by 
Benjamin Bennett 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2014 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Jeffrey Coles, Chair 
Claudia Custodio 
Ilona Babenka 
Michael Hertzel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
May 2014  
   i 
ABSTRACT  
   
I examine the determinants and implications of the level of director monitoring. I use the 
distance between directors' domiciles and firm headquarters as a proxy for the level of monitoring 
and the introduction of a new airline route between director domicile and firm HQ as an exogenous 
shock to the level of monitoring. I find a strong relation between distance and both board meeting 
attendance and director membership on strategic versus monitoring committees. Increased 
monitoring, as measured by a reduction in effective distance, by way of addition of a direct flight, 
is associated with a 3% reduction in firm value. A reduction in effective distance is also associated 
with less risk-taking, lower stock return volatility, lower accounting return volatility, lower R&D 
spending, fewer acquisitions, and fewer patents. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Directors assume several important roles on the corporate board, including advising and 
monitoring the management team Mace (1971).  Generally, monitoring includes the overseeing of 
management, board selection, evaluating usage of the firm’s resources, succession planning, 
reviewing financial performance, and ensuring compliance with the law (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  
Potential benefits to the firm include less perquisite consumption, appropriate pay, and better 
decisions pertaining to corporate control and financial distress.  For example, conventional wisdom 
suggests that a greater level of director monitoring, as measured by board independence, improves 
managerial decisions and firm performance.1   Nonetheless, directors are not meant to be operating 
managers (Lorsch and McIver (1989)).  Too much oversight and interference may reduce 
innovation, risk-taking, maneuverability, speed, and thus firm value.  Some studies suggest that 
this cost of “excessive” monitoring may be destructive rather than beneficial.2   Monitoring requires 
collecting and processing of soft information by outside directors.  This is much easier done locally 
than from afar.  As such, distance and the cost/ease of travel to and from the firm headquarters 
(HQ) are important determinants of the monitoring a director can provide.  In this context, I 
examine empirically the effect of an exogenous shock to the effective distance between a director 
and the firm.  Specifically, my identification strategy uses the introduction of a new airline route 
between director domicile and firm HQ as a shock to the effective distance between the two.  This 
shock reduces the cost of gathering hard and soft information and thus increases the level of 
monitoring.   
In my analysis I investigate the effect of an increase in monitoring on firm value.  I employ 
a proxy for a change in monitoring, specifically the addition of a new direct flight between the 
                                                 
1 For example, several studies show that (non-management) directors on the board affect discrete tasks, including hiring 
and firing of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) ((Borokhovich, Parrino, & Trapani, 1996; Weisbach, 1988)), adoption of 
antitakeover devices ((Brickley et al., 1994)), and negotiating takeover premiums ((Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Cotter, 
Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997)). 
2 For example, see Adams & Ferreira (2007), Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi (1997) and Faleye et al. (2011).  
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directors residence and the firm HQ.  I use Tobin’s Q, defined as the sum of book value of assets 
and market value of assets less shareholder equity scaled by the book value of assets, as my proxy 
for firm value/performance (following Berger and Ofek (1995)).  Additionally, I control for the 
distance between directors and firm HQ, the reason being that distance has been shown to be 
related to firm value (Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012)).   
Distance, however, is likely to suffer from endogeneity concerns.  For example, a firm with 
high growth opportunities is likely to have high Tobin’s Q and also a relatively high demand for 
board advising relative to monitoring.  If advising is a scarce input, then it is likely that firms will 
cast a wider net for advisory directors and distance will be higher.  If the empirical design does not 
control fully for growth opportunities, the regression model can detect a spurious positive relation 
between Q and distance.  As a second example, a firm with an entrenched management team 
could extract excessive compensation and perquisites, with low Q as a result.  That same 
entrenched management team also might reduce board monitoring by selecting more-distant 
directors.  This would induce a negative relation between Q and director distance.  In either event, 
an exogenous shock to effective distance would avoid such endogeneity problem and permit 
cleaner identification of the effect of monitoring on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q.  
My results demonstrate that an increase in monitoring, due to the addition of a direct flight, 
leads to a 3% reduction in Tobin’s Q.  This is equivalent to a reduction in firm value of $322M on 
average.  This result is qualitatively consistent with Faleye, Hoitash, & Hoitash(2011).  Both their 
result and mine, at first glance, can seem somewhat counterintuitive.  Nonetheless, an exogenous 
shock to the level of monitoring, which had been determined optimally prior, is likely to lead to a 
suboptimal level of monitoring and, consequently, lower performance and value.    
In addition to performance and value, a shock to the level of monitoring likely changes the 
incentives of executives to take risk.  I expect this increase in monitoring to reduce the willingness 
and ability of executives to take risk and, thus, the volatility of stock and accounting performance 
will be lower.  I investigate the portion of volatility associated with distance on future stock return, 
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return on assets (ROA) and sales growth.  I find that the exogenous shock that increases monitoring 
is associated with a decrease in firm risk taking, as measured by the forward looking standard 
deviation of the previously mentioned variables.   
I proceed by exploring the channels through which this decrease in firm risk-taking takes 
place.  Following Faleye et al. (2011), I investigate the risk profile of the firm, specifically: as 
measured by the frequency of major acquisitions and research and development (R&D) spending.  
I find that a new direct flight is accompanied by a 0.1% decrease in R&D expenditures.  I also find 
a significant relation between the addition of a new direct flight and a decrease in acquisitions.  
These findings are consistent with the belief that additional monitoring and oversight cause a 
decrease in risk taking.   
Increased monitoring is likely to have an impact on the ability of firm executives to extract 
rents or lead the quiet life.  Correspondingly, I investigate changes to CEO compensation and 
turnover as a result of the increase in monitoring.  Previous studies have found that an increase in 
the level and quality of monitoring leads to stronger managerial incentives in compensation 
contracts and higher turnover performance sensitivity.3   I do not find any evidence, however, that 
an exogenous increase in monitoring amplifies either wealth-performance sensitivity or the 
sensitivity of executive turnover to firm performance.  This is weakly consistent with my hypothesis.  
My evidence does not support the hypothesis that increased monitoring is detrimental (as 
conventionally defined) to compensation contracts or turnover-performance sensitivity, but I can 
state that it is not beneficial to shareholders in either of these respects.   
To ensure that there is a relationship between effective distance and the level of 
monitoring, I examine the effect of a new direct flight on board meeting attendance.  The addition 
of a new flight results in a 75% decrease in “low” attendance.4   This is consistent with the 
                                                 
3 See Core, Holthausen, & Larcker (1999), Faleye et al., (2011), Weisbach (1988), and Yermack (1996).  
4 This refers to the ‘low_attend’ variable in RiskMetrics which equa ls 1 if a board member attends less than 75% of board 
meetings in a given year, and 0 otherwise. 
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hypothesis that there is a significant relation between a new direct flight and the level of 
monitoring. 
My paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways.  Although I am not the first to 
utilize distance, to my knowledge no prior work examines the association between firm value and/or 
risk-taking and the effective distance between directors and firm HQ.  I also find that the level of 
director monitoring has significant effects on firm risk-taking. 
Second, I use distance in a new way.  By examining an exogenous shock to effective 
director distance, as measured by the addition or subtraction of a direct flight, I provide and exploit 
an identification mechanism for cleanly dealing with endogeneity in my empirical context.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the identification strategy.  
Section 3 presents the main empirical results.  Section 4 contains additional tests.  Section 5 
investigates CEO characteristics.  Section 6 contains robustness checks and section 7 concludes.  
   5 
                CHAPTER 2 
IDENTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION 
There is ambiguity in the literature about the effect corporate governance has on firm 
value.  For example, Popadak (2013), Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2008) find instances where governance is positively related to firm value in some cases and 
negatively related in others.  Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) find that the stock-market reaction 
to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and 
negative when it does not.  Further, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) find that optimal board size 
depends on the level of firm complexity, among other factors, which contradicts the earlier findings 
of Yermack (1996).  More recently, Popadak (2013) finds a positive association between 
governance and value in the short term, but one that switches to a negative association in the long 
term.  What these papers suggest is that the link between governance and value is ambiguous.  
One possible reason is the possibility that the prior experimental designs suffer from endogeneity 
problems, such as might arise from omitted variables or reverse causation.  Thus, my general 
approach is to find a way to minimize such endogeneity concerns so as to better identify the 
estimated relation between monitoring and firm performance and risk. 
Regarding endogeneity and empirics, regression design decisions that can help address 
endogeneity problems include the use of industry and firm fixed effects.  Nonetheless, there can 
be significant variation within industries.  Additionally, firm unobservables may affect firm 
performance (future projects, etc).  Adding firm fixed effects is an improvement potentially can 
control better for firm variation within industries and firm unobservables. Similarly, director 
unobservables may affect firm performance (quality of education, year of experience, number of 
social connections, etc).  Firm fixed effects, however, will not capture the director unobservables.  
Similarly, controlling for director fixed effects will fail to capture firm unobservables.  But, using a 
firm-director (spell) approach controls for the combined influence of firm and director fixed effects 
and mitigates possible concerns about estimation bias.  Using this method, neither the director nor 
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the unobserved (time-invariant) firm characteristics vary for a given spell.  Effectively, this uses 
only the differences between two consecutive observations so the identification in my experimental 
design comes from changes in the presence of a direct flight.  
I do two things to address the standard endogeneity concerns.  First, I control for firm-
director interaction (spell) fixed effects.  Second, my main identification variable, the introduction 
of a new direct flight between a director’s residence and the firm HQ, is an exogenous shock.  This 
new direct flight decreases the cost of travel for that director (fewer flight segments, fewer 
layovers, less time, lower cost).  And using the firm-director fixed effects model allows the direct 
flight dummy to be estimated using the variation in the time series (for firm-directors who 
experience a change in the direct flight status), rather than from the cross section (firm-directors 
who never experience a change in the direct flight status).  This holds all other independent 
variables approximately constant and isolates the effects of the new direct flight. 
Other literature that uses geographical distance can be contaminated by endogeneity 
concerns through either omitted variables or reverse causality.  For example, a firm could have low 
Tobin’s Q because of fraud and perquisite taking.  The entrenched CEO in that situation would 
want to select more-distant board members who are less able and inclined to monitor effectively 
and so that he/she could continue the excessive perquisite taking.  Another example could be a 
firm with high growth opportunities and a high demand for advising directors (who potentially are 
in lower supply forcing the firm to search distantly) thus increasing distance of board members.  
An example of reverse causality is a director who refuses to serve on the board of misbehaving 
executives unless he is proximal because he knows the demand for monitoring and soft 
information5 is very high.   
                                                 
5 Petersen (2004) defines “soft” information as information that cannot be codified and transferred across geographic 
distance. 
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Previous literature examines the cost of excessive monitoring and finds similar results.6   
Unfortunately, the variables of interest in that literature are determined within the context of the 
model.   Within their context, it is impossible to conclude whether the monitoring caused the 
reduction in firm value or the reduction in firm value caused the increase in monitoring.  My paper 
resolves this issue with an exogenous shock to the variable of interest. 
Although I control for firm-director fixed effects, there could be other potential alternative 
explanations.  Direct flights could be added as a result of local market/economy improvements or 
the anticipation of such improvements.  These improvements would cause an increase in business 
and leisure travel and correspondingly the airlines schedule new flights into the area.  A positive 
shock to the business environment would cause an increase in Tobin’s Q which would make my 
result weaker.   
Alternatively, direct flights could be added as a result of surge in new business or improved 
revenue to the firm under consideration.  New flights would therefore be added to service new 
customers or increases in transit from existing customers.  These new flights would occur as the 
result of an increase in Tobin’s Q.  This effect would generate a positive association between Q 
and distance, and effect that would weaken my results. 
It is possible that directors are taking business jets to travel to/from their board meetings.  
If this is the case, there should be no effect on Tobin’s Q after the introduction of a new direct 
flight between the firm and the director’s home residence, as directors would not be using a 
commercial carrier.  It is possible, however, that the director would forego the business jet and fly 
commercial via the new direct flight, in which case there would be no change in attendance or the 
level of monitoring.   
It is possible that directors change residences during the sample period.  They could 
relocate from a city without a direct flight to one with a direct flight.  This would result in the direct 
                                                 
6 (Faleye et al., 2011b) find that firms with intense monitoring suffer lower acquisition returns and lower corporate 
innovation. 
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flight variable switching from zero to one.  One possible reason for such a change could be the 
firm’s business in the new city has increased or it has opened a new plant and wants more city-
specific information from its board.  I address this by limiting my sample to only board members 
who do not change residences throughout my sample period.  Excluding those directors does not 
change the results.  
   9 
              CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
The data used in this study derive from the Compustat universe of firms merged with the 
RiskMetrics S&P1500 Directors Data and the ThomsonReuters Insiders Data for the period 2000–
2011.  The size of the sample is 116,658 director-firm years on 14,586 firms.  Following the 
literature, I have removed all regulated industries (Finance and Utilities) from my database.   
DISTA NCE DATA 
I calculate the distance that each member needs to travel to attend meetings between his 
home zip code and that of the firm.  I construct this using zip codes from board member’s SEC 
insider holding filings (Form 3 and 4) and from Firm Headquarters (Compustat variable ‘ADDZIP’).  
I begin with all ownership data from 2000-2011 in the ThomsonReuters Form 3 and Form 4 
database.  I then match that with Riskmetrics SP1500 director data for the same period.  Merging 
these databases gives me the zip codes of all directors and eliminates all inside owners who are 
not also directors.  Next, I merge the zip codes of the directors (from ThomsonReuters and 
RiskMetrics) with firm HQ zip codes (from Compustat).  I then convert the zip codes into latitudes 
and longitudes.  Then I use the SAS command ‘Geodist’ to calculate geodetic distance between the 
two locations.  This measure has very little noise as zip codes are sufficiently small (the average 
US zip code is 27 miles2 or 70 km2).  This distance variable helps me proxy for board members 
cost of obtaining ‘soft’ information.   
FLIGHT DATA 
The data on airline routes are obtained from the T-100 Domestic Segment Database (for 
the period 1990 to 2011), which are compiled from Form 41 of the U.S. Department of 
Transportation (DOT).  All airlines which operate flights in the U.S. are required by law to file Form 
41 with the DOT and are subject to sanctions for misreporting.  Strictly speaking, the T-100 files 
include all flights that have taken place between any two airports in the U.S.  The T-100 contain 
monthly data for each airline and route (segment).  The data include origin and destination airports, 
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flight duration (ramp-to-ramp time), scheduled departures, departures performed, passengers 
enplaned, and aircraft type.  For further explanation of these data see Giroud (2013).7    
PATENT DATA 
 The patent data comes from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent 
data project managed by Jim Bessen.  The most recent updates to the site were made in August 
of 2013.   
FIRM LEVEL DATA 
All accounting data at the firm level come from Compustat, while stock return data come 
from CRSP.  I also utilize geographical data from the United States Postal Service’s website.  Merger 
and Acquisition (M&A) data are obtained from SDC.   
DIRECTOR AND EXECUTIVE DATA 
I obtain director variables such as outside boards, age, etc., from RiskMetrics.  I obtain 
CEO compensation data from Execucomp.  The geographical director data come from the 
ThomsonReuters insider holdings (Forms 3 and 4) database within WRDS.   
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 1 presents the summary results for the firm level and individual level data.  The 
average firm assets are approximately $9B.  You can see that the average board member lives 710 
km from the board he sits on.  There is a direct flight between 11% of directors and firms.  That 
number fails to take into account the fact that approximately half of directors live within driving 
distance to the firm’s headquarters.  Of those non-local directors8, for whom airline transportation 
is less costly, at least 16% have a direct flight between their home city and firm headquarters.   
Table 2 presents the summary statistics broken out by whether the director is local or non-
local.  I define local as living within 100 km of the headquarters.  Further, firm level data is broken 
                                                 
7 I would like to thank Xavier Giroud for discussing the T-100 airline data with me. 
8 Non-local directors are defined as those whose residence is more than 100km from firm headquarters. 
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out by local versus non-local board.9   To distinguish between local and non-local board I calculate 
average distance and then split the sample into two halves.  The largest difference at the director 
level is that non-local board members tend to sit on far more other boards than local directors 
(0.75 compared to 1.19).    
                                                 
9 Non-local boards are defined as those whose average board member distance between the firm and his/her residence is 
higher than the yearly median distance. 
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                                                   CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
In this section, I analyze the relationship between the level of monitoring and firm value.  
and discuss the results. 
FIRM VALUE 
Following the literature, I use (the natural logarithm of) Tobin’s Q10 as a proxy (and 
dependent variable) for firm performance.  The controls in this regression follow Custódio and 
Metzger (2013).  Table 3 presents findings of a panel regression of firm performance on director 
distance.  The independent variables of special importance to my paper are those that measure 
the travel costs for a director to interact face to face with other board members and firm 
management.  The two variables which measure this are distance (kilometers) and whether or not 
there is a direct flight between the director’s residence and the firm HQ.  Direct flight is a dumm y 
variable set to 1 if a direct flight exists between the director’s residence and the firm HQ.11    
The identification in Table 3 arises from using year plus either firm or firm-director fixed 
effects.  The estimated coefficient on the direct flight dummy is negative and significant in all 
specifications.  This is evidence of a decrease in effective distance between the director’s residence 
and the firm headquarters, a corresponding increase in board monitoring, and a negative effect on 
firm performance.  The coefficient is significant in both statistical and economical terms.  A 3.2% 
decline in Tobin’s Q represents approximately a $288M decline in firm value (Specification 4).   
Specification 3 finds distance to be negative and significant.  This is in line with the findings 
of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012).  To the contrary, the results of Specification 4, which utilizes 
improved identification and finds distance not significantly related to value, is evidence that 
specification 3 potentially suffers from endogeneity.   
                                                 
10 My tests are robust to the use of Tobin’s Q rather than the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q.  My reason for using the 
natural logarithm in my tests is because there is evidence of the presence of skewness in the Tobin’s Q variable. 
11 Direct flight is set to 1 for local directors.  It is worth noting that my results are robust to removing local directors.  But 
if I do so, I lose the majority of my observations.   
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Table 3 and 4 estimations are contemporaneous.  The reason for this is that new routes 
are announced approximately 6-9 months before they begin service for large US airlines (American, 
Delta, and United).  Additionally, meetings occur frequently (most boards meet between 4-6 times 
a year in my sample) and thus the new direct flight would affect the firm rather quickly.  It is worth 
investigating the effect of an exogenous shock to effective distance over time.  Figure 1 shows the 
persistence of this shock over time.  The point estimates in the figure are the cumulative change 
in Tobin’s Q in subsequent quarters for the sample of firm-director spells which experienced the 
addition of a new direct flight.  This indicates that it takes the firm approximately 3 years to return 
to an optimal level of monitoring.  
FIRMS MORE SENSITIVE TO INCREASED MONITORING 
Some firms are likely to be more sensitive to increased monitoring than others.  If firm 
management has a larger ability to take risks and affect/alter the operations and direction of the 
firm, it is likely that  an increase in monitoring would hamper them more than if the management 
team had little discretion.  Take, for instance, a trucking firm.  The manager is unlikely to have 
substantial discretion to take risks in an advantageous way that would differentiate his firm from 
his competitors.  The same trucks and technology are available to all trucking firms, the business 
environment is the same for all firms (laws, roads, speed limits, etc.), and firm costs tend to be 
very similar (employees, gasoline, etc.).  Now, for a moment, imagine the manager of a motion 
picture firm.  He or she has a much larger amount of freedom of choice.  She can choose animated 
or traditional films, dramas, comedies or scary movies, and can choose among a wide spectrum of 
available actors, actresses, and directors.  She can choose to film in New Mexico or New Zealand, 
where there are large tax benefits, or in a more traditional location, such as Los Angeles or New 
York City.  These examples suggest that there are many possible decisions through which a 
manager of a motion picture firm can increase or decrease the risk of her firm.  An increase in 
monitoring would likely have a larger impact on the motion picture CEO than it would the trucking 
firm CEO.   
   14 
Table 4 looks at firms which should be more sensitive to an increase in the level of 
monitoring.  I hypothesize that the estimated effect of a decrease in effective distances will be 
stronger than in firms where management has less latitude and discretion.  Speci fication 1 
examines firms with a higher than median Herfindahl index.12   These firms are in more 
concentrated industries.  Managers of these firms will have less competition and therefore have 
more leeway in changing the risk profile of the firm.  An increase in monitoring would hamper the 
manager of a firm in a high-Herfindahl industry more than one in a less concentrated industry.  In 
Specification 1, the parameter estimates indicate that there is a 3.9% decrease (though p = 0.164) 
in Tobin’s Q of firms in high-Herfindahl industries after an exogenous decrease in effective distance.  
The argument can be made the proportion of assets that are intangible is a proxy for 
industries or firms in which managers have a larger ability to affect the operations and future cash 
flows of their firms.  A manager of a firm with a high portion of assets which are intangible operates 
with latitude and discretion that most managers do not have.  Some of the most common 
intangibles on balance sheets are patents, trademarks, and copyrights.  If a manager has many 
patents then he is free to do what he likes in the space where these patents apply, without any 
interference from anyone else in his industry.  Google has $7.5B of intangibles on its balance sheet 
while McDonalds has zero.  Google’s management is free to innovate and pursue driver-less cars 
or glasses with a built in camera, risks that potentially give rise to new sources of future income.  
McDonalds on the other hand, is in the business of selling low-cost meals as efficiently as possible.  
There is no patent required for their $0.99 hamburger.  Their goal is to cut costs wherever possible.  
I hypothesize that an increase in monitoring would have a larger effect on the managers of Google 
than it would on the managers of McDonalds.  That is what the data show.  I find a large and 
significant 8.8% reduction in Tobin’s Q after a decrease in effective distance for those firms which 
have higher than median intangibles on their balance sheet (Specification 2). 
                                                 
12 The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in an industry 
and then summing the resulting numbers. 
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Lastly, I investigate the Hambrick and Abrahamson (1995) measure that quantifies the 
latitude of actions a manager is allowed.  In their paper, they list seven factors that affect 
managerial discretion: product differentiability, market growth, industry structure, demand 
instability, quasi-legal constraints, powerful outside forces, and capital intensity.  They found that 
computer programming firms had the highest discretion score while steel mills had the lowest.  It 
is intuitive that the manager of a computer programming firm would have a larger degree of leeway 
in which to operate his firm than would the manager of a steel mill.  Thus, an increase in monitoring 
would hurt the computer programming manager more than it would the manager of the steel mill.  
I report results consistent with this hypothesis in Specification 3.  The firms with higher than median 
discretion scores experience an 8.7% decrease in Tobin’s Q following a decrease in effective 
distance.   
RISK TAKING 
Brick and Chidambaran (2007) find a negative relationship between the level of board 
monitoring and firm risk taking.  Likewise, though using a design that explicitly addresses 
identification concerns, I test whether an exogenous increase in monitoring changes the incentives 
of executives to take risk.  If it does, I expect an increase in monitoring to reduce the volatility of 
stock and accounting performance.  Following Guay (1999), I use the volatility of stock return as 
a proxy for firm risk taking.  Additionally, I investigate the volatility of select accounting measures: 
sales growth, leverage, net income and earnings per share (EPS).  I expect the volatility of these 
measures to decrease as a result of the increased monitoring.   
I calculate the standard deviation of stock return using the next year’s returns on a daily 
frequency, while the standard deviation of ROA and sales growth are computed using quarterly 
data over the future five year period.  I include distance, firm size, leverage, prior volatility, and 
firm and year fixed effects as controls.  Table 5 reports the results.  I find a negative and significant 
relationship between predicted measures of firm risk taking and the presence of a direct flight 
between the board member’s residence and the firm HQ.   
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RISK TAKING CHANNELS 
Increased monitoring is consistent with a decrease in risk-taking and a more conservative 
investment policy.  I now investigate whether firm investment policy is the  channel by which the 
additional monitoring affects firm risk. 
Various studies rely on the notion that expenditure on R&D is riskier than spending on hard 
assets, such as property, plant, and equipment (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)).  The idea, 
in part, is that R&D intensity creates real options, while other capital expenditures represent 
exercised real options.   
Patents are another measure of the creation of real options, an intangible asset.  Patents 
increase the protective moat surrounding the firm’s intellectual property.  One useful way to 
quantify the output of R&D or innovation is through the number of patents granted to a firm (see 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012).  To investigate this channel I explore the potential relationship 
between patents and a decrease in effective distance. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) note that directors have an active role in the formulation in the 
long term strategic, financial, and organizational goals of the corporation and approve plans to 
achieve these goals.  Future strategic goals include deciding the mix of future cash flows, in part 
determined by mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  Acquiring or merging with another firm is one 
potential way a firm can use investment to provide a shock to the level and volatility of a firm’s 
cash flows and returns.13    
The specifications in Table 6 investigate the effects of a decrease in effective distance on 
firm investment policy, specifically R&D expenditures, the number of patents, and mergers & 
acquisitions.14   Specification 1 shows the effect of a decrease in the effective distance, by way of 
                                                 
13 Additionally, directors have a higher fiduciary hurdle when it comes to M&A.  (Lin, Officer, & Zou, 2011) state that M&A 
lawsuits are the principal litigation risk faced by directors in fiduciary duty suits.   
14 Additional monitoring is consistent with less risk taking and potentially a more conservative financial policy.  Consistent 
with this, I investigated cash holdings and firm leverage.  I found significant relationships with the addition of a new direct 
flight and both of these metrics.  Cash holdings increased by 6% while leverage decreased by 4% when running the 
investment policy regressions found in Table 4B but substituting investment policy metrics (R&D, patents, large acquisitions) 
for financial ones (leverage and cash holdings).   
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the addition of a new direct flight, on R&D intensity.  A decrease in effective distance results in a 
decrease in Research and Development expenditures of 3%.  In dollar terms, this 3% equals a 
decrease of $261,000 per firm year.   
Substantiating the notion that additional monitoring leads to less innovation is tested in 
Specification 2, which investigates the effect of a decrease in effective distance has on the number 
of patents granted to a firm.  I find that patents decrease by 8 per firm year.  The average number 
of patents per firm year is 32.  This represents a 25% reduction in innovation, as represented by 
patents.   
Lastly, I investigate the M&A activity of the firm using large acquisitions as my dependent 
variable (Specification 3).  Large acquisitions are defined as any acquisition larger than the yearly 
median acquisition.  One of the major ways firms can take risks, grow, and alter their future cash 
flows are through the purchase of another firm’s existing cash flows and products.  I find a negative 
shock to effective distance results in a decrease in acquisitions of a statistically and economically 
significant $725,000 per firm year. 
DECREASED RISK TAKING AS A MECHANISM FOR LOWER FIRM VALUE 
I now assess whether the reduction in risk-taking arising from increased monitoring is a 
potential explanation for the decline in firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q.  In a first stage,  as 
reported in Tables 5 and 6, I regress risk or investment policy measures on the direct flight 
indicator, distance, firm control variables, and fixed effects.  I then calculate the predicted future 
values based on data aligned in time with Tobin’s Q for each firm year.  In the second stage, I use 
the predicted values of the risk measures as the main independent variable and investigate their 
effect on Tobin’s Q.   
As Table 7 indicates, there is a positive and significant relationship between the predicted 
forward looking firm risk proxies and firm value for all seven risk-taking measures.  A decrease in 
effective distance has a negative effect on future firm risk-taking, as measured by the predicted 
values of the volatility of ROA, sales growth, and stock returns and levels of R&D intensity, scaled 
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patents, and scaled acquisitions.  It appears that the decrease in risk-taking, arising from an 
exogenous increase in monitoring, is a significant channel for the decline in Tobin’s Q, as estimated 
and reported initially in Table 3.    
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    CHAPTER 5 
CEO COMPENSATION AND TURNOVER 
CEO COMPENSATION 
One of the board’s monitoring functions is to provide managerial incentives through optimal 
compensation contracts.  Bebchuk and Fried (2005) argue that this process is inefficient and 
management manipulates their compensation to the detriment of shareholders.  As such, many 
existing papers focus on the relationship between compensation incentives and monitoring.  Core, 
Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) conclude that better monitoring, consisting of CEO duality, less 
director independence, less busy boards, and a lower portion of the board over age of 69, leads to 
better compensation incentives.  Additionally, Yermack (1996) finds that smaller boards set better 
compensation incentives.   
Based on the above, the hypothesis is that more monitoring leads to “better” compensation 
contracts.  This would appear empirically in terms of excess or residual compensation.  I measure 
excess compensation using residuals from a baseline regression predicting normal compensation 
as a function of the economic determinants of executive pay.  Standard economic theory implies 
that CEO compensation depends on the relative demand and supply of top executive talent.  The 
baseline regression controls for firm size, market-to-book ratio, stock performance, accounting 
performance (ROA), and risk (stock volatility). 
The excess compensation regressions include controls that proxy for board monitoring.  If 
more monitoring adds value, it should decrease the excess/residual compensation net of other 
economic factors.   
Table 8 presents the results.  Contrary to what others have found in this setting, I do not 
find that more monitoring reduces residual executive compensation.  The presence of a direct flight 
is insignificant for all forms of residual compensation: total, cash, and equity.  On the other hand, 
note that I find no evidence that lower monitoring is associated with rent extraction by executives.  
An exogenous shock to monitoring has no significant association with residual pay. One advantage 
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of my empirical design is that it is less likely to suffer from endogeneity concerns as do the other 
studies.   
CEO TURNOVER 
Hermalin (2005) argues that a board’s most important role pertains to selection, 
monitoring, retention, and dismissal of the CEO and that the probability of CEO turnover increases 
with the level of monitoring.  Yermack (1996) and Weisbach (1988) both find that independent 
boards are more likely to dismiss a CEO following a period of poor performance.  Others find a 
decrease in performance sensitivity of turnover is generally related to weaker monitoring.   
 To test the relation between an increase in monitoring and CEO turnover I estimate logistic 
regressions using CEO turnover as the dependent variable.  The variable of interest in these 
regressions is the interaction between abnormal return and the presence of a direct flight.  I expect 
this variable to be negative and significant under the improved monitoring hypothesis.  Additionally, 
I control for other factors known to affect CEO turnover, including board composition (Weisbach, 
1988), board size (Yermack, 1996), and CEO duality (Goyal and Park, 2002). 
 Table 9 presents the results of this regression.  I estimate the marginal effect of increased 
monitoring on turnover performance sensitivity to be insignificant.  Thus, the CEO is no more likely 
to be terminated for poor performance following an increase in monitoring.    
My results are consistent with the literature.  Turnover is related to abnormal return.   
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   CHAPTER 6 
ROBUSTNESS 
In this section, I corroborate that distance is a proxy for the level of monitoring.  
Additionally, I examine how the main results behave when the specification is modified.  If the 
findings are robust and plausible, I will be better able to interpret the evidence as valid.   
ATTENDA NCE 
Attendance is one of main places that the increased monitoring will show up in the data.  
It is important to note that monitoring consists of much more than board meeting attendance 
though.  Monitoring happens outside of meetings at dinners with the CEO, lunches with mid level 
managers, walking around manufacturing plants, interacting with blue collar employees, talking to 
suppliers and customers to get feedback, surprise ad-hoc inspections, etc.  One way to proxy for 
monitoring is through board meeting attendance.  If a board member does not attend board 
meetings or visit firm headquarters it will be difficult for him to monitor. 
The variable in consideration in Table 10 is ‘low_attend’ from RiskMetrics which is a binary 
variable set to 1 if the board member attends less than 75% of board meetings.  This variable is 
noisy and imprecise.   For example, if a director’s attendance goes from 70% in year 1 to 76% in 
year 2, this variable will go from 1 to 0.  A 6% change in attendance probably does not show up 
in the data very often, but if it did, it would cause a significant change in the ‘low_attend’ variable.  
I realize this is not optimal, but it is a limitation of the data.   
Ease of travel, distance and effective distance affect a director’s likelihood of attending 
board meetings.  Table 10 confirms this.  The first table shows that local board members have the 
highest board meeting attendance, followed by non-local directors with a direct flight, followed 
lastly by directors without a local flight.  The second table is an event study.  It examines at all 
directors from a firm over the sample period.  For example, Apple has 5 directors and in 2003 one 
director gets a new direct flight added from his hometown to firm headquarters in Cupertino, CA.  
The top row (“Directors with no new flight added”) will be the average low attendance for all 
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directors who do not experience a change in their direct flight status over the sample period.  In 
the “Pre” column will be their average low attendance prior to 2003 and in the “Post” column will 
be there average low attendance from 2003 onwards.  The director with the new direct flight in 
2003 will have his average low attendance in the bottom row (“Directors with new flight added”).  
The “Pre” column will have his low attendance average for all years prior to 2003 and the “Post” 
column will have his average low attendance for 2003 onwards.  Thus if any shock within the firm 
(bankruptcy, hostile takeover, crisis, etc) causes an increase in board meeting attendance for all 
directors there will be a significant change for all directors, those with and without a new direct 
flight.  This method will allow for the differentiation between the firm’s monitoring demands causing 
an increase in board meeting attendance versus a decrease in effective distance causing an 
increase in board meeting attendance.  The test for differences in means between attendance of 
directors with a new direct flight (“Pre” vs “Post”) is significant at the 1% level.  While the same 
test for directors who had no new direct flight added was insignificant. 
If the local directors have low attendance 1.1% of the time while the distant directors with 
no direct flight have low attendance 1.9% of the time.  In terms of economic significance, a non-
local director is 70% more likely to have poor/low attendance if there is no direct flight.   
Table 10 presents two logistic regressions and an odds ratio test using the low attendance 
variable as the dependent variable and direct flight and other controls as the independent variables.  
Direct flight is negatively and significantly related to low attendance.  The negative sign on the 
direct flight variable indicates that low attendance decreases (or high attendance increases) as a 
direct flight is added.  Additionally, for those directors farther than the median distance, the direct 
flight variable is more significant (Specification 2).  Intuitively distance is also highly significant in 
predicting low attendance and goes in the expected direction (as distance increases, attendance 
decreases).  This finding is consistent with the results of Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2011).  
Specification 3 shows an odds ratio test for board meeting attendance.  The interpretation for the 
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results of this test is that when a new direct flight is added the director is 28.5% less likely to have 
poor/low attendance.   
The evidence that a new direct flight affects director attendance is strong.  This is likely 
the mechanism by which the increased monitoring takes its form.  Yermack (1996) provided the 
empirical result for the now conventional wisdom that smaller boards are better boards.  My 
evidence is consistent with his findings.  Perhaps attendance does not always create an 
environment that is most conducive to consensus, decisiveness, and efficiency of decision making.  
To the extent, that board monitoring is positively associated with board size, my evidence is 
consistent with that notion. 
DIRECT FLIGHT REMOVED 
Most of the changes in flight status occur when an airline wants to expand its services and 
add a new flight.  But sometimes an airline will find that a particular flight is not profitable and will 
thus remove it.  In the data, there are roughly 2 new flight routes added for every 1 eliminated.  
As a robustness check, it is useful to investigate only those observations where a direct flight is 
canceled to check to see if those observations are driving my main results.   
Table 11 shows only cases where a direct flight was removed, thus exogenously increasing 
effective distance.  There is a negative and insignificant effect on firm value.   
DIRECTORS MOVING RESIDENCES 
It is possible that my results are skewed due to directors moving residences at some point 
within my sample period.  It is possible that by moving to a new house, a director decreases the 
distance between his domicile and the firm HQ or moved to a city offering a direct flight for reasons 
related to the firm, which would make the shock endogenous instead of exogenous.   
To ensure that these instances are not driving my results in Table 12, Specification 1, I 
include only those directors which did not change domiciles within the sample period.  The result 
for this subset of directors is stronger than they are for the entire sample (4.1% for directors who 
do not move versus 3.1% for all directors in the sample).  For completeness, in Specification 2, I 
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show the same regression for only those directors who change domiciles in my sample period.  It 
may be worth noting that many directors changed domiciles in my sample period.  This is not too 
surprising as many of these directors are very senior people, with many ties to many firms, and in 
very high demand.  The utility of them moving may be higher than it is for the average person, 
especially if a move eliminates 10 or 20 costly, long distance trips per year to attend board 
meetings.   
MONITORING COMMITTEES 
The principal monitoring committees of a board are audit, compensation, and nominating 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007).  The audit committee oversees financial reporting and internal 
controls.  The compensation committee administers all executive compensation schemes.  The 
nominating committee evaluates candidates for board positions, reviews the performance of 
directors, and assesses the strength of the firm’s governance structure.  Following Faleye, Hoitash, 
and Hoitash (2011), I define a monitor as a director who sits on at least 2 of the 3 principal 
monitoring committees.15    
If a decrease in distance results in an increase in monitoring then there should exist a 
relationship between distance and the likelihood of being on a monitoring committee.  If this 
relationship exists, then it follows that monitoring is less specialized and in higher supply.  To test 
this, I will check i) the average distance of monitors compared to that of advisors, ii) the proportion 
of local monitors versus the proportion of all local directors on the board, and iii) use distance as 
a regressor to predict a director being a monitor.   
Table 13 shows there are more local monitors (59% of all monitors are local) than local 
directors (56% of all directors are local).  Moreover, the average distance of independent monitors 
is significantly greater than that of independent advisors (results not shown).  And lastly, in Table 
10, Specification 1, the logistic regression indicates that distance is negatively related to the 
                                                 
15 As a robustness check, I add an alternate, more restrictive definition in which I require that a monitor i) be on at least 2 
of the 3 monitoring committee and ii) not be a member of any advisory committees (acquisitions, finance, investment, 
strategy, science & technology, and executive).  My results do not change using this more restrictive definition.  
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likelihood that a director is a monitor.  All evidence supports the hypothesis that monitors tend to 
be more local.   
As a robustness check for my economic significance figures stated above ($322M change 
in firm value as a result of increased monitoring), Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) find a $650M 
change in a firm’s market value if the firm suffers from intense monitoring.    
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                                       CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
Considerable literature has focused on board monitoring and advising in isolation.  The 
level of monitoring appears to be associated to firm characteristics, policy, and performance.  I 
build on such previous literature to empirically examine the determinants and implications of 
director monitoring.   
I use the distance between the director’s home and the firm HQ as a proxy for this and 
the introduction of a new airline route as a source of exogenous variation in the level of monitoring.  
Corroborating that distance is related to the mix of monitoring and advising, I find a strong positive 
relation between distance and low board meeting attendance and director membership on 
monitoring committees.   
I find that a reduction in the effective distance between director’s residence and 
headquarters leads to a 3% reduction in the firms Tobin’s Q.  I also provide results suggesting that 
the reduction in effective distance increases the amount of monitoring by the director.  
Consequences of this increased monitoring include less risk taking, less R&D, fewer patents, and 
fewer large acquisitions by the firm.   
My paper calls into question existing empirical results that distant directors decrease firm 
value.  Moreover, my specification likely better represents part of the true relation between board 
structure and performance.  The endogeneity and identification problem has been handled and the 
independent controls are more comprehensive (include a precise measure of distance as well as 
takes into account the existence of an available direct flight).  Further work on this question is 
needed.   
There is recent evidence that boards are increasing their proportion of monitoring versus 
advising.  Heidrick and Struggles (2007) report that 84% of directors in its survey indicated that to 
at least some extent they are now spending more time on monitoring and less on strategy.‖ This 
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new tendency towards increased monitoring is likely not optimal as Faleye, Faleye, Hoitash, and 
Hoitash (2011) find lower acquisition returns, lower patent quality, and lower firm value.‖  
Given the importance of this tradeoff, firms may reevaluate the level of monitoring to 
investigate ways to introduce more advising into the mix on their boards.  The possibilities for 
doing so are many.  In an effort to find the right level of monitoring, Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash 
(2011) propose methods for firms to correct for this excessive monitoring including: (i) enlarging 
the board so the firm has more freedom in allocating committee assignments and individual 
independent directors are not overburdened with oversight/monitoring duties, (ii) increasing board 
independence so that there are more independent directors available for the monitoring 
committees thereby decreasing each independent directors monitoring responsibilities, and (iii) 
reducing the size of oversight committees.  These potential solutions require further examination.  
Additionally, future research could examine the optimal mix of monitoring and advising, while 
taking into account other factors not previously considered, such as the demand for hard and soft 
information, foreign directors, and other technologies which affect a director’s ability to monitor or 
advise (for example, Skype).   
The results presented here highlight the importance of the tradeoff a firm faces when it 
chooses its level of monitoring.  An exogenous shock to monitoring has a detrimental effect on firm 
value.     
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APPENDIX A  
DATA DEFINITIONS 
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Variable Name  Variable Definition  
Firm Size  Natural logarithm of a firm’s Total Assets.  
 
Tobin’s Q  
 
Natural log of book value of long-term debt 
and debt in current liabilities plus the market 
capitalization of the firm divided by Total 
Assets.  
 
Cash Flow/Assets  
 
EBITDA divided by Total Assets.  
 
Leverage  
 
Long term debt and debt in current liabilities 
divided by the book value of debt and market 
capitalization of the firm.  
 
R&D/Assets  
 
 
Advertising/Assets  
 
 
Acquisitions/Assets  
 
 
Cash  
 
 
CEO Total Compensation  
 
CEO Delta  
 
 
 
 
CEO Vega  
 
R&D expenditures of the firm (XRD in 
Compustat) divided by Total Assets.  
 
Advertising Expenses of the firm (XAD in 
Compustat) divided by Total Assets.  
 
Acquisitions of the firm (AQC in Compustat) 
divided by Total Assets  
 
Cash (CHE in Compustat) of the firm divided 
by Total Assets minus Cash.  
 
TDC1 variable CEO in Execucomp  
 
The PPS of a CEO’s equity pay during a fiscal 
year is the approximate change in value of 
granted equity that would correspond to a 
$1,000 change in total shareholder wealth.  
 
The PPS of a CEO’s option pay during a fiscal 
year is the approximate change in value of 
granted options that would correspond to a 
$1,000 change in total shareholder wealth.  
 
Board Size  
 
Number of members on the board of 
directors.  
 
Board Independence  
 
Number of board members who are classified 
as independent directors divided by the 
number of total board members.  
 
CEO Equity Pay  
 
CEOs’ Black-Scholes value of stock option 
grants (OPTION_AWARDS_BLK_VALUE), value 
of restricted stock grants (RSTKGRNT), LTIP 
payments (LTIP), and bonuses (BONUS), 
divided by total compensation (TDC1).  
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CEO Cash Pay  
 
 
 
ROA  
 
 
Distance  
CEOs’ bonus (BONUS) and LTIP payments 
(LTIP) divided by total compensation (TDC1) 
net of salary (SALARY).  
 
Net income (NI in Compustat) divided by 
Total Assets.  
 
Distance, in kilometers, between the directors 
home residence and the firm headquarters. 
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Figure 1. The Effect of New Airline Routes on Firm Value over Time. This table presents the 
cumulative percentage change in Tobin’s Q after the addition of a new direct flight between a 
director’s home residence and firm headquarters.  It is calculated by taking the average change in 
Tobin’s Q in the subsequent quarters after a new flight was added for a director (only for those 
directors who had a new flight added).  Of the entire sample of directors, 2068 directors had both 
a new flight added and quarterly data available.   
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Director Characteristics Obs Mean  Median SD 
Distance (km) 113630 710 14 1296 
Other Boards 116661 0.92 0 1.21 
Direct Flight 106990 0.11 0 0.31 
Director Age 116658 60.2 61.0 8.7 
MSA Distance (km) 110601 126 44 197 
Direct Flight Added 3804    
Direct Flight Removed 2426    
     
CEO Characteristics Obs Mean  Median SD 
Total Compensation 8951 6180 4031 6623 
Cash Compensation 8951 0.327 0.269 0.273 
Equity Compensation 8951 0.725 0.775 0.266 
Vega 8311 0.15 0.09 0.27 
Delta 8311 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     
Firm Characteristics Obs Mean  Median SD 
Assets 14586 8729 1791 33311 
Capex/Assets 14529 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Acquisitions/Assets 14529 0.03 0.19 0.23 
RD/Assets 14529 0.03 0 0.06 
Advertising/Assets 14529 0.01 0 0.04 
Board Size 8939 9.7 9 2.4 
Board Ind 8939 0.73 0.75 0.15 
Tobin’s Q 14504 1.69 1.28 1.55 
ROA 14529 0.04 0.05 0.18 
MSA Distance (km) 14345 132 52 179 
Leverage 14449 0.21 0.16 0.20 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for directors, CEOs and firm characteristics of SP1500 firms from 
2000-2011.  MSA distance is the distance between the director (or the firm) and the nearest 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) measured in kilometers.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  
The unit of observation is director-firm year.   
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Director Characteristics Local Non-Local P-Value (Diff in Mean) 
Distance (km) 5 1731 0.0000 
Other Boards 0.753 1.188 0.0000 
Direct Flight 1.000 0.165 0.0000 
Director Age 60.133 60.288 0.0028 
MSA Dist (km) 124 129 0.0001 
CEO Vega 0.151 0.138 0.0000 
CEO Delta 0.011 0.010 0.0000 
CEO Total Compensation 5871 6685 0.0000 
    
CEO Characteristics Local Non-Local P-Value (Diff in Mean) 
CEO Total Compensation 5871 6685 0.0000 
CEO Cash Compensation 0.329 0.324 0.0171 
CEO Equity Compensation 0.718 0.736 0.0000 
    
Firm Characteristics Local Non-Local P-Value (Diff in Mean) 
Assets 8495 9065 0.0344 
Capex/Assets 0.052 0.053 0.0072 
Acquisitions/Assets 0.028 0.029 0.5443 
RD/Assets 0.032 0.027 0.0000 
Advertising/Assets 0.014 0.013 0.0253 
Board Size 9.5 9.93 0.0000 
Board Ind 0.72 0.74 0.0000 
Tobin’s Q 1.719 1.651 0.0000 
ROA 0.038 0.034 0.0026 
MSA Distance (km) 125 142 0.0000 
Leverage 0.196 0.219 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics for Local versus Non-Local Directors 
This table presents summary statistics and univariate tests for difference in means for local versus non-
local directors of SP1500 firms from 2000-2011.  A director is local if he resides within 50 km of the 
firm HQ.  MSA distance is the distance between the director (or the firm) and the nearest metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) measured in kilometers.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  The unit of 
observation is director-firm year.   The sample size can be found in Table 1. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
          
Direct Flight -0.023*** -0.034** -0.016* -0.032* 
 [-2.583] [-1.993] [-1.852] [-1.768] 
Distance   -0.002** -0.001 
   [-2.402] [-0.385] 
Assets -0.057** -0.075** -0.050** -0.065** 
 [-2.423] [-2.465] [-2.012] [-1.972] 
Leverage -1.575*** -1.616*** -1.576*** -1.623*** 
 [-24.858] [-21.485] [-21.520] [-19.226] 
Capex 0.953*** 0.681*** 0.855*** 0.647*** 
 [4.824] [3.134] [3.968] [2.679] 
RD -0.139 -0.144 0.042 0.200 
 [-0.285] [-0.292] [0.081] [0.341] 
Cash 0.550*** 0.526*** 0.491*** 0.461*** 
 [6.064] [5.001] [4.172] [3.142] 
Volatility 0.273*** 0.316*** 0.286*** 0.327*** 
 [5.743] [5.944] [5.470] [5.389] 
Firm FE Yes No Yes No 
Firm-Director FE No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 67,152 67,152 40,133 40,133 
R-squared 0.836 0.897 0.846 0.902 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
The Effect of New Airline Routes on Firm Value 
This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of the Log of Tobin’s Q on distance and presence 
of a direct flight between directors’ home residence and firm headquarters and other firm level control 
variables.  Firm-Director or firm and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.  Observations 
are director-firm year.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level. 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Tobins Q Tobins Q Tobins Q 
        
Direct Flight -0.005 0.022 -0.008 
 [-0.220] [0.721] [-0.250] 
Herfindahl -0.509   
 [-0.403]   
High Herfindahl * Direct Flight -0.039   
 [-1.395]   
Intangibles  0  
  [-1.585]  
High Intagibles * Direct Flight  -0.088**  
  [-2.368]  
Discretion   0.023 
   [1.050] 
High Discretion * Direct Flight   -0.087* 
   [-1.689] 
Distance -0.002 0 0.001 
 [-0.466] [0.104] [0.152] 
Assets -0.067** -0.136*** -0.117*** 
 [-2.033] [-3.708] [-2.935] 
Leverage -0.395*** -0.461*** -0.536*** 
 [-3.581] [-4.502] [-5.094] 
Capex 0.710*** 1.096*** 1.113*** 
 [3.082] [3.849] [3.611] 
RD 0.104 0.321 0.37 
 [0.168] [0.517] [0.619] 
Cash 0.604*** 0.651*** 0.731*** 
 [4.837] [4.189] [4.864] 
Volatility 0.132** 0.242*** 0.244*** 
 [2.188] [3.477] [3.281] 
Firm-Director FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 34,899 40,135 33,780 
R-squared 0.917 0.876 0.87 
 
Table 4 
The Effect of New Airline Routes on Firms which are More/Less Sensitive to Increased Monitoring 
This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of the Log of Tobin’s Q on the herfindahl index, 
intangibles scaled by total assets, discretion score, the interactions between herfindahl, intangibles, 
and discretions score and direct flight, the distance between directors’ home residence and firm 
headquarters, the presence of a direct flight between same and other firm level control variables.  Firm-
Director and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.  Observations are director -firm year.  
Appendix A contains variable definitions.  The high herfindahl, intangibles, and discretion variables 
were set equal to 1 if a firm was above the annual median value and 0 otherwise.  Discretion score is 
a score that proxies for management's ability to affect/alter the operations and the direction of the 
firm.  For more on it, see Abrahmson and Hambrick (1995).  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level. 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES R&D  Patents Acquisitions 
        
Direct Flight -0.001* -8.441** -0.003* 
 [-1.653] [-2.131] [-1.687] 
Assets -0.012*** 9.808 0.025*** 
  [-7.534] [1.365] [3.506] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 63,136 22,299 31,029 
R-squared 0.948 0.907 0.427 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
The Effect of New Airline Routes on Firm Risk-Taking 
This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of the effects of firm risk-taking, using the 
standard deviation of stock return, sales growth, and return on assets (ROA) on the presence of a 
direct flight between directors’ home residence and firm headquarters and the natural logarithm of 
total firm assets.  The standard deviation of stock return is done using the previous year’s returns on 
a daily frequency.  The standard deviation of sales growth and ROA are computed using quarterly data 
over the previous five years.  Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.  
Observations are director-firm year.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  Significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SD ROA SD Sales Growth SD Stock Price 
        
Direct Flight -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 [-1.299] [0.127] [-0.321] 
Assets -0.003*** -0.012*** -0.034*** 
  [-9.678] [-6.586] [-16.414] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 98,445 98,421 63,323 
R-squared 0.099 0.144 0.458 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
The Effect of New Airline Routes on Firm Risk-Taking Channels 
This table presents estimates of OLS panel regressions of the effects of firm risk-taking, using R&D 
expenditures scaled by assets, the number of patents generated, acquisitions scaled by assets on the 
presence of a direct flight between directors’ home residence and firm headquarters and the natural 
logarithm of total firm assets.  Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.  
Observations are director-firm year.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  Significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
              
Pred(Future RD) 43.644***      
 [51.681]      
Pred(Future Patents)  0.091***     
  [55.610]     
Pred(Future Acquisitions)   88.076***    
   [51.511]    
Pred(SD ROA)    2.043   
    [0.425]   
Pred(SD Sales Grow th)     89.307***  
     [50.682]  
Pred(SD Stock Price)      19.511*** 
      [62.674] 
Assets 0.120*** -2.336*** 2.090*** 7.247*** -0.462*** -0.139*** 
  [11.201] [-53.081] [50.166] [77.046] [-46.222] [-34.013] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 61,018 61,018 61,018 60,615 40,211 60,615 
R-squared 0.939 0.935 0.937 0.804 0.878 0.862 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Decreased Risk-Taking as a Channel for the Negative Effect of Increased Monitoring on Firm Value 
(Tobin’s Q) 
This table presents estimates from 2nd-stage panel regressions of the effects of predicted future firm 
risk-taking on firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, while including control variables and fixed 
effects.  The variables which serve as proxies for firm risk taking are the predicted values of the 
standard deviation (SD) of sales growth, ROA, and stock price, and the predicted levels of R&D, patents, 
and acquisition spending, all scaled by total assets, each predicted from a first stage regression reported 
in Table 4A or 4B.  The standard deviation of stock return is calculated using the next year’s returns 
on a daily frequency.  The standard deviation of ROA and sales growth is computed using quarterly 
data over the future five year period.  The R&D, patent, and acquisition variables are calculated using 
the next year’s R&D, patents, and acquisitions scaled by total assets.  Industry and year fixed effects 
are included in all specifications.  Observations are director-firm year.    Appendix A contains variable 
definitions.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
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Panel A: Compensation    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity Compensation 
        
Assets 0.460*** -0.013*** 0.055*** 
 [31.330] [-3.234] [14.077] 
Market-to-Book 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000* 
 [-0.567] [-3.125] [-1.925] 
Stock Volatility 0.231** -0.105*** 0.011 
 [2.532] [-3.621] [0.408] 
Stock Return -0.019 0.007 -0.008 
 [-0.706] [0.822] [-0.889] 
ROA 0.900*** 0.426*** 0.233*** 
 [4.781] [9.560] [4.127] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 64,590 65,129 65,449 
R-squared 0.495 0.087 0.128 
        
Panel B: Excess Compensation    
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Total Compensation Cash Compensation Equity Compensation 
        
Direct Flight 0.01 0.003 0.001 
 [0.723] [0.530] [0.199] 
Distance -0.003 0 0 
 [-1.542] [-0.365] [-0.403] 
CEO Duality -0.06 0.009 -0.014 
 [-0.885] [0.399] [-0.524] 
Busy Board 0.118 -0.051 0.125 
 [0.404] [-0.439] [1.369] 
Directors > 69 yrs old 0.187 -0.076 -0.106 
 [0.792] [-0.957] [-1.348] 
Board Size -0.018 0.005 -0.007 
 [-0.786] [0.639] [-0.745] 
Board Independence 0.429 0 0.048 
 [1.235] [-0.001] [0.324] 
Institutional Ow nership -0.415 -0.004 -0.116 
 [-1.437] [-0.028] [-0.950] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12,009 11,945 12,013 
R-squared 0.731 0.625 0.656 
 
Table 8 
The Effect of New Airline Routes on CEO Compensation 
Panel A presents regressions predicting normal CEO compensation as a function of the economic 
determinants of executive pay during 2000-2011.  Panel B presents regressions explaining excess 
compensation, defined as residuals from the respective Panel A regressions.  Panel B control variables   
include the presence of a direct flight between directors’ home residence and firm headquarters and 
other firm level monitoring control variables.  Industry and year fixed effects are included in all 
specifications.  Observations are director-firm year.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
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  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CEO Turnover CEO Turnover CEO Turnover 
        
Direct Flight  -0.003 -0.275 
  [-0.005] [-0.305] 
Abnormal Return -1.785** -1.574** -1.268 
 [-2.503] [-2.172] [-1.305] 
Abn Return * Direct Flt  -1.868 -5.139 
  [-0.623] [-1.615] 
Distance   -0.039 
   [-0.497] 
Busy Board   1.498 
   [0.484] 
CEO Duality   0.639 
   [1.036] 
Institutional Ownership   -0.666 
   [-0.260] 
Board Size   0.076 
   [0.227] 
Board Independence   -2.478 
   [-0.630] 
CEO Age   0.049 
   [0.870] 
Assets   -0.305 
   [-0.755] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Psuedo R-squared 0.074 0.257 0.257 
Observations 6,183 6,183 1,316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
The Effect of New Airline Routes on CEO Turnover 
This table presents estimates of logistic regressions of CEO turnover on the presence of a direct flight 
between the director and the firm HQ, the presence of that direct flight interacted with the abnormal 
return of the firm, and other board monitoring and firm control variables.  Industry and year fixed 
effects are included in all specifications.  Observations are director-firm year.  Appendix A contains 
variable definitions.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, 
respectively.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
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 Local Non-Local 
Low Attendance No Flight Direct Flight 
No Direct 
Flight 
Mean 0.011 0.015 0.019 
    
 
Low Attendance Pre Post Difference in Means 
Directors with no new fl ight added 0.0132 0.0131   0.0001 
Directors with new fl ight added 0.0288 0.0256         0.0032*** 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Low Attendance Low Attendance Low Attendance 
 All Non-Local High Distance  Odds Ratio 
       
Direct Flight -0.005* -0.006** 0.715* 
 [-1.870] [-2.120] [-1.95] 
Assets 0.000 0.000 1.011 
 [0.320] [0.330] [0.27] 
Leverage 0.004 0.009 1.295 
 [0.652] [1.361] [0.79] 
Capex 0.008 -0.008 1.562 
 [0.326] [-0.306] [0.33] 
R&D 0.021 0.013 3.291 
 [0.774] [0.444] [0.78] 
Volatility 0.011 0.008 1.733 
  [1.544] [1.023] [1.49] 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 19,992 10,839 19,992 
R-squared 0.007 0.007   
 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Distance and its Effect on Attendance 
This table presents summary statistics and univariate tests for difference in means between directors 
with a new flight added and those without a new flight added.  This table also presents an OLS analysis 
of low board meeting attendance on distance between director’s home residences and firm 
headquarters.  Industry and year fixed effects are included in the regression.  ‘High Distance’ includes 
only those directors who live farther than the mean distance.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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  (1) 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q 
    
Direct Flight Removed 0.024 
 [0.462] 
Distance 0.021 
 [0.578] 
Assets -0.144 
 [-0.824] 
Leverage -1.172*** 
 [-2.789] 
Capex 1.494 
 [0.987] 
RD -4.987 
 [-1.249] 
Cash 0.340 
 [0.293] 
Volatility 0.804 
 [1.506] 
    
Firm-Director FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
  
Observations 503 
R-squared 0.979 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 
The Effect of an Eliminated Direct Flight on Firm Value 
This table presents estimates of director-firm interacted fixed effects panel regressions of Tobin’s q on 
the distance between directors’ home residence and firm headquarters (kilometers and direct flight).  
Observations included are limited solely to those instances where a direct flight was eliminated.  Firm-
Director and year fixed effects are included.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  Significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the firm level. 
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  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
 Do Not Move Move 
      
Direct Flight -0.041* -0.024*** 
 [-1.848] [-2.930] 
Assets -0.066** -0.069*** 
 [-2.189] [-3.253] 
Leverage -1.357*** -1.346*** 
 [-18.708] [-21.841] 
Capex 0.682*** 0.828*** 
 [3.251] [4.305] 
R&D 0.752 0.887* 
 [1.201] [1.776] 
Cash 0.604*** 0.494*** 
 [5.919] [5.562] 
Volatility 0.369*** 0.344*** 
  [6.201] [7.432] 
Firm-Director FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
   
Observations 21,048 47,610 
R-squared 0.848 0.850 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12 
Direct Flight’s Effect on Firm Value Considering Only Directors who do and do not Change Residence  
This table presents estimates of executive-firm interacted fixed effects panel regressions of Tobin’s Q 
on the distance between directors’ home residence and firm headquarters (kilometers and direct flight).  
Observations in Specification 1 are limited solely to those instances where a director did not change 
residences throughout the sample period.  Observations in Specification 2 are limited solely to those 
instances where a director did change residences within the sample period.  Year fixed effects are 
included.  Appendix A contains variable definitions.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 
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Type Mean t-stat (difference in means compared to Total) P-Value 
Monitor (Local) 0.586 6.70 0.0001 
Total (Local) 0.555   
 
 
  (1) 
VARIABLES Monitor 
    
Distance -0.132** 
 [-2.461] 
    
Industry FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
  
Observations 7,676 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13 
Board Committee Composition – Monitoring 
This table presents a t-test which determines if there is a significant difference between the fraction of 
local monitors and local outside directors in the full sample.  The ‘Total (Local)’ bar serves as a baseline 
of comparison; it is the number of local versus nonlocal outside directors on all boards in the sample.  
Monitors are defined as directors who sit on at least 2 of the 3 principal monitoring committees (audit, 
compensation, and nominating).  Local is defined as a director who lives within 50km of the firm’s 
headquarters.  Also presented is a logistic regression which includes distance as the independent 
variable and monitor as the dependent variable.  The regression includes both industry and year fixed 
effects.   
